Scott Aaronson, newly elected to the US National Academy of Sciences, warns that fault-tolerant quantum computers capable of breaking RSA and elliptic curve crypto may arrive by ~2029.
Key Takeaways
Trusted quantum hardware and error-correction researchers now tell Aaronson a cryptographically relevant QC is plausible by ~2029; he stresses this is their estimate, not his.
Aaronson co-authored a Coinbase-convened position paper with Dan Boneh, Justin Drake, Sreeram Kannan, Yehuda Lindell, and Dahlia Malkhi on the quantum threat to cryptocurrencies.
RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curve cryptography are the primary targets of Shor’s algorithm; symmetric ciphers and hashes are generally considered already resistant.
Aaronson explicitly flags the “race to build CRQCs is actually the ethical move” argument as suspiciously parallel to galaxy-brained AI acceleration reasoning.
His actionable ask: start migrating to post-quantum (NIST-standardized) encryption now and pressure your org, blockchain, or standards body to do the same.
Hacker News Comment Review
Skeptics pushed back hard on the 2029 timeline, noting the largest number ever factored by Shor’s algorithm on real hardware is 21 (2012), with a 2019 attempt at 35 reportedly failing, suggesting the engineering gap remains enormous.
A recurring practical question from engineers and CTOs was concrete next steps: whether drop-in PQC replacements exist for tools like ssh-keygen -t ed25519, and what the migration path actually looks like today.
Several commenters flagged that the “scale up a known process” framing overstates certainty – unlike the Manhattan Project’s uranium pipeline, there is no single uncontroversial QC architecture to simply scale.
Notable Comments
@Ardren: Links a 2025 paper showing the 2019 factorization of 35 via Shor’s algorithm actually failed, calling current hardware records “worse” than widely cited.
@AndrewStephens: Argues researchers briefing Aaronson may be caught in their own hype cycle, noting the “one more hurdle” story has persisted since at least 1996.
